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2 minimising some ad hoc loss function or maximising the welfare of a representative agent that arises from a particular macroeconomic model.
The emphasis on rules harks back to the work of Friedman (1968) and Kydland and Prescott (1977) . However, Friedman emphasised the importance of adherence to a rule in order to pre-empt attempts at stabilisation on the part of policymakers, as this was likely to exacerbate fluctuations in economic variables due to the complicated nature of the monetary transmission mechanism and policymakers' ignorance about the correct model of the economy.
1 Kydland and Prescott's (1977) argument in favour of rules relied on the presence of rational expectations, in that allowing the monetary authority to exercise discretion would result in a higher steady state level of inflation than when the central bank was constrained by a rule. This additional channel provided further support for the commitment of monetary policymakers to explicit and transparent rules.
Although the issues of rules and time inconsistency remain relevant, the Real Business Cycle (RBC) school of thought, with its emphasis on real shocks as the main source of output fluctuations and its reliance on flexible prices, led to a decline in interest on monetary policy, since it was regarded as a largely ineffective stabilisation tool. 2 With the dominance of New Keynesian 3 macroeconomics, which embodies the presence of nominal rigidities, the effects of monetary policy shocks and the consideration of alternative monetary policy frameworks have again gained prominence. Consequently, the logic underlying Taylor's (1993) article -and much of the current analysis concerning monetary policy rules -is that the monetary authority's commitment to a rule in the presence of nominal rigidities would be successful at stabilisation as long as the parameters in the policy rule remain within a reasonable range. Moreover, Taylor argued that US monetary policy could be usefully described not only by a mechanical rule but by a simple rule, whereby interest rates increased in response to rises in inflation above an implicit target and to a positive output gap.
However, it is worth emphasising, as it is being increasingly recognised in the literature that one should interpret empirical results on Taylor-type rules as parsimonious representations of central bank behaviour, without necessarily implying that a mechanical rule is being followed, or indeed, that the Taylor rule is the only way of describing the data. A second line of research has focused on the optimality of alternative monetary policy rules. Within this, some have posited ad hoc loss functions on the part of the central bank from which the loss-minimising monetary policy rule is derived. A more theoretically satisfactory approach has relied on deriving the monetary policy rule that is obtained by maximising the welfare of the representative agent derived from a fully developed SDGE model. This approach is obviously superior from a theoretical point of view, but may suffer from the fact that its conclusions may be specific to the model being studied and will not be robust to further modelling extensions.
Within the study of optimal monetary policy rules, one can also split research into two strands: those where monetary policy is optimal in a general sense, and those that focus on simple rules, that is, where interest rates respond to a small set of variables, with the Taylor rule being the most prominent example. The former are obviously superior from a welfare point of view, as the objective is to derive the policy rule that achieves -or is closest to -a well defined objective, whereas simple rules are constrained in the form that the rule may take by, e.g., restricting the number of arguments in the function. Nevertheless, simple rules have the advantage of being clearly understandable and transparent, so that not only would the objectives of monetary policy be well understood, but uncertainty regarding the 5 future path of nominal interest rates would be reduced given the predictability of the rule. Moreover, even though simple rules may perform badly under some scenarios (Isard et al. 1999) , well specified simple rules will generate a determinate (unique) rational expectations equilibrium.
An additional issue concerns whether the policy of, say, inflation targeting, should be interpreted as a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule. The latter provides a well defined function for the instrument, such as a short term interest rate, as a function of economic variables, whereas under a targeting rule the objectives of policy are clearly specified and the central bank is strongly committed to achieving the objectives. 5 The interest rate is then used as an instrument in order to achieve the inflation target. In other words, an instrument rule states that the central bank is committed to adhering to a specific function for interest rates and under a targeting rule the central bank is committed to achieving some objective.
No central bank has publicly stated that it has followed an instrument rule, whereas and constraints successful, these will be shown in the present paper.
II. PROPOSED RULES FOR MONETARY POLICY
The volume edited by Taylor (1999) 11 A related point is put forward by Svensson (2003) . 12 See Woodford (2003, p. 252-261) .
where t π denotes the deviation of inflation from its (possibly implicit) target value and x denotes the output gap.
That is, the nominal interest rate is adjusted each quarter to respond to deviations in the target values of inflation and output. However, most empirical studies on Taylor rule variants have found that the lagged interest rate enters (1) and that it is strongly significant, modifying (1) to:
A theoretical rationale for the inclusion of the lagged interest rate in (2) can be found in Woodford (2003, p.280) , in that the maintained high interest rates in response to rises in inflation or the output gap, for given 1 δ , 2 δ , have larger stabilising effects upon current output gap and inflation. A crucial feature that any monetary policy rule must possess is that it will ensure determinacy -both real and nominal -in the economy. The Taylor principle, 1 1 > δ , is generally a necessary requirement for the uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium.
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Nevertheless, as Fuerst (2000, 2001 ) demonstrate, the timing on which the monetary policy rule is based can also be crucial in order to prevent disastrous effects on the real economy. To avoid this Carlstrom and Fuerst propose either current or backward-looking Taylor rules. However, this conclusion runs counter to the professed approach of explicit inflation targeting central banks, which for the present paper is most relevant for the UK, as their approach is forwardlooking. Whereas backward-looking rules have been proposed on the grounds of avoiding indeterminacy, the rationale in support of forward-looking rules is based primarily on the fact that it takes into account the lags in the monetary transmission mechanism (Batini and Haldane, 1999) .
These two different Taylor-type rules, which differ on the timing of the explanatory variables to which the monetary policy instrument reacts can be succinctly represented as:
Where j represents the possible information lag to which the central bank is subject.
14 k (m) is a positive integer when the central bank reacts to expectations of future inflation (output gap), and a negative integer under a backward-looking
Taylor-type rule.
In contrast to the proposed rules where the only difference concerns timing, Walsh (2003) has argued that a speed limit policy dominates inflation targeting as long as the model is predominantly forward-looking, since under a discretionary policy the 13 The general condition can be found in Woodford (2003, p. 254). central bank is able to achieve higher social welfare when it reacts to changes in the output gap. Whereas the Taylor rule can be derived from quadratic preferences, a speed limit rule implicitly embodies a more general form. Consequently, the rule proposed by Walsh (2003) would take the form:
Lastly, another Taylor-type rule that has been prominent in the literature arises when one allows for a more flexible form of the central bank's objective function. If the central bank's loss function is asymmetric, so that negative and positive deviations in the inflation rate and the output gap are assigned different weights, the optimal Taylor rule would be non-linear, 15 so that the Taylor rule (2) would be modified to:
Hence, the Taylor-type rules that this paper will focus on are forward and backwardlooking rules, speed limit and non-linear rules, as well as the basic Taylor rule (2) which will be considered as the benchmark.
III. PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF SIMPLE MONETARY POLICY RULES
Results from empirical studies that have estimated monetary policy rules have generally adopted one of two approaches. Most have been descriptive (Taylor, 1993) and have attempted to determine whether simple rules provide a useful description of actual monetary policy behaviour. On the other hand, some authors have adopted a more normative approach, by characterising the monetary policy rules during periods of successful stabilisation and therefore attributing the superior outcome to the monetary policy rule of the central bank (Clarida et al, 2000) .
Although the Fed does not have an explicit inflation target, it is committed to achieving low and stable prices as well as promoting employment growth, so that a monetary policy rule as a function of inflation and some measure of real activity may provide a realistic description of actual behaviour. In this sense, Taylor's (1993) article, whilst it used calibrated values in the policy rule, provided the first analysis of such a function. Furthermore, most estimated monetary policy rules for the Fed have found that a Taylor-type rule has provided a reasonable description of actual monetary policy. Clarida et. al. (2000) found that monetary policy during the Volcker-Greenspan years (1979:3 to 1996:4) 15 An insightful analysis of such preferences in a monetary policy context can be found in Nobay and Peel (2003) . 16 The coefficient on the output gap (incorrectly defined as hp detrended output) was also high, at 0.93.
during the period 1992-97, whilst Adam et al (2005) found that monetary policy was forward looking in terms of inflation, but responded to the current output gap.
The robustness of the Taylor principle has also been found in other studies. Ball and Tchaidze (2001) analysed US monetary policy in terms of inflation and unemployment during the Greenspan years (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . They found that the rule had been relatively stable throughout the period once one allowed for changes in the NAIRU, with a coefficient on inflation of 1.29 for the "old economy" period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) and 1.54 during the "new economy" years (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) .
An additional issue concerns the inclusion of the lagged interest rate when estimating monetary policy rules. Although its inclusion is generally interpreted as reflecting partial adjustment in the behaviour of interest rates (Clarida et. al. 2000) , Rudebusch (2002) has argued that the significant lagged interest rate is the result of serially correlated residuals. However, in attempting to disentangle the two effects, English et. al. (2003) found that the former argument is the dominant cause for the significance of the lagged interest rate.
Meanwhile, Surico (2003) Regarding evidence on the speed limit policy, Peel et al (2004) did find empirical support for a speed limit policy for the US, although to this author's knowledge no research has been carried out regarding its relevance for the UK.
Nevertheless, despite the vast amount of research on estimating monetary policy rules for the US -and to a lesser extent, the UK -there is no clear consensus on the interest rate rule that best characterises each economy during a common sample period, such as the Greenspan era in the US and the period of inflation targeting in the UK.
IV. RESULTS FROM SOME PROPOSED SIMPLE INTEREST RATE

RULES
This section aims to compare the four monetary policy rules proposed by theoretical concerns using a common sample to determine if the behaviour of either the Fed or the Bank of England can be well characterised by one of these rules.
Rules where the interest rate responds directly to the exchange rate have not been included in this paper. Taylor (2001) is sceptical of including the exchange rate in the policy rule, as it is likely to worsen the outcome of stabilisation policies. Further support for this point of view emerges from Allsopp et al (2006) , who argue that under an inflation targeting regime with a flexible exchange rate, the latter matters only to the extent that it affects the inflation rate, rendering a direct reaction to it unnecessary.
14 The results for the US are shown in Table 1 In estimating the forward-looking monetary policy rule, various timing horizons were considered, and only the one with the best fit is reported, which is the Taylortype rule where interest rates react to the forecast of inflation (the output gap) eight (four) quarters ahead.
[ Again, several inflation measures were considered, with the measure that yielded the best fit being the annual rate of RPI inflation. 22 Interestingly, the regressions with RPIY inflation -which removes the effects of indirect taxes -yield poorer results, despite the fact that Cutler (2001) found that it was the best predictor of future inflation, in other words, it could be defined as core inflation. Table 2 reports the estimates of the various models. It is interesting to note that the UK's monetary policy rule that best describes the data corresponds to the one that is closest to research emanating from the Bank of England (Batini and Haldane, 1999 and Nikolov, 2002) , that is, a forward looking rule. For the sample considered the best fit is obtained when the forecast horizon is four quarters for both inflation and the output gap. As with the Fed, the Taylor principle is satisfied, 23 although the coefficient on the output gap is higher than that on inflation, albeit less precisely estimated. Moreover, whilst for the US the results on inflation were generally consistent across models, at least with regards to the coefficient on inflation, for the UK results are highly sensitive to the timing of the Taylor rule, especially in the case of the backward-looking Taylor rule, with the clear implications that the results are highly sensitive to correctly choosing the appropriate horizon specification. 21 Although this is common practice, as mentioned earlier one should be aware that this is not the equivalent measure from a theoretical output gap measure. 22 In the estimations, inflation is then RPI minus the official inflation target. Modifying this to the gap using first RPIX and then CPI inflation, the Bank's official target, has not effect on the results.
[ Therefore, it could be argued that the dynamics of interest rates are not captured by the models presented above, but that an error correction form provides a superior representation of the data 24 . Early empirical support for this formulation can be found in Judd and Rudebusch (1998) , in the form of a modified basic Taylor rule: 23 However, it is not significantly above unity. 24 In effect, equation (6) can be seen as a re-parameterisation of an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model embodying an error correction model. Hence it can be interpreted as a Taylor rule but with richer dynamics. 25 Their estimation was conducted by least squares on the grounds that given the lags in the monetary transmission mechanism, reverse causation from interest rates to inflation and output was unlikely.
To determine whether the residual autocorrelation is due to the fact of the poorer dynamics in the previous models, they are now presented in Table 3 for the speedlimit and non-linear Taylor rules. In addition, difference rules have also been found to be optimal under a variety of contexts, with the underlying rationale being an extension to the inclusion of the lagged interest rate in the Taylor rule. 26 The rationale is that the commitment to maintaining higher interest rates in the future in response to a positive inflationary or output gap shock in the present induces greater stabilisation in these two variables.
In additioun, Orphanides and Williams (2002) propose a difference rule on the grounds that it is more robust in the face of problems measuring the natural rate. The rule they put forward takes them form:
where ue denotes the unemployment rate.
27 Giannoni and Woodford (2003) proposed an alternative rule, which can be interpreted as a speed limit rule that is optimal from a timeless perspective within the context of the model they analyse, and is represented by equation (8):
Lastly, Walsh (2005) argued that a difference rule provide a robust simple rule when faced with possible parameter misspecification, especially regarding the degree of inflation inertia.
28 This leads to the simple interest rule: Table 3 presents the monetary policy rules in differences for the US. Of the different measures of inflation considered, the best fit was provided by the quarterly percentage change in the GDP deflator (at an annualised rate). Although the dynamic Taylor rule provides a reasonable description of movements in the Federal funds rate, the best model is given by the speed limit policy, as initially put forward by Walsh (2003) , but with allowance for richer dynamics.
29 Moreover, the long-run response to the inflation rate of 2, is consistent with previous findings in the literature, whilst there is also a strong response to changes in the output gap, of 0.29.
The monetary policy rules considered by Walsh (2005) , and Giannoni and
Woodford (2003) also include a speed-limit component, which is even stronger, although less precisely estimated, and in both cases the coefficient on inflation is strongly significant. Nevertheless, the Giannoni-Woodford rationale for the particular rule they derive does not provide an appropriate characterisation of 27 This is measured as the civilian unemployment rate in the present paper. 28 However, as Walsh also points out, this rule performs substantially worse than the optimal rule under more general misspecification. 29 Previous empirical support for a speed limit rule was found by Peel et al. (2004) .
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interest rate behaviour, as the coefficient on the lagged interest rate should be positive.
Lastly, while in the non-linear specification the inflation rate provides little explanatory power, the Orphanides-Williams formulation yields a negative coefficient on the inflation rate, with their generally poor empirical performance reflected in the high SBC values they yield.
Overall, in analysing the Fed's behaviour within the scope of simple interest rate rules, an error correction formulation in which interest rates follow a speed limit policy does seem to provide a reasonable characterisation of the data and this formulation has a theoretical basis to support it.
[ The same models estimated for the UK are presented in Table 4 , but none of the models can describe the data well. The Orphanides-Williams, and the GiannoniWoodford specifications suffer from the same problems as in the US estimation. The coefficient on inflation is strongly significant under the specification considered by Walsh (2005) , although the change in the output gap is insignificant at the 10% level, whilst residual normality is also rejected.
[ TABLE 4] Once again, the non-linear formulation is unsuccessful at characterising the data, with the coefficients on inflation being insignificant. However, in contrast to the US results, the interaction coefficient between output and inflation is positive and significant, as expected.
Overall, within the model in differences, UK monetary policy is best described by a simple Taylor It is generally agreed that a necessary criterion for any policy rule is that it should ensure determinacy and that this result be robust under a variety of models.
Nevertheless, within rules that do yield a unique rational expectations equilibrium, different rules may possess additional benefits, such as being robust to parameter 22 uncertainty, being more efficient (in the sense of Ball, 1999) , or better capturing the preferences of policymakers.
Although no central bank has indicated that it follows a mechanical policy instrument rule, economic research normally assumes or derives particular rules with the aim of analysing their consequences under different modelling formulations.
Given that much of this research has been conducted within central banks, one could argue that some of the proposed monetary policy rules have emerged as a result of carrying out monetary policy, whilst at the same time policymakers are influenced by academic developments. In essence, although central banks may not adhere to a rule, given the interactions mentioned above it could be argued that a rule may provide a close description of actual monetary policy.
Constraining the analysis to simple interest rate rules, this paper has considered whether some prominent simple monetary policy rules that have been proposed in the academic literature have been reflected in practice at either the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England.
The introduction of inflation targeting seems to have led to a substantial decrease in inflation persistence, and this has been reflected in the rule that best characterises interest rate behaviour in the UK, that of a forward looking Taylor rule.
Given that the US does not have explicit numerical objectives -as well as having real objectives -the simple monetary policy rule that provides a reasonable description of interest rate behaviour is a speed limit rule, as initially suggested by 30 See Benati (2007) . Walsh (2003) , except for the fact that it embodies richer dynamics, in the form of an error correction model, or alternatively, in an ARDL representation.
Thus both central banks' estimated interest rate rules do have underlying theoretical support, and the particular rules that provide the best description of monetary policy in each country are consistent with their official policy objectives.
Lastly, while a considerable amount of research has been devoted to estimating monetary policy rules under varying assumptions, there has been little effort to assess which of these rules provides the best description of actual behaviour using the same sample period. In focusing on a selection of simple rules, the results of this paper can be regarded as a first step in that endeavour. 6.92 (0.55) Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. B-P-L denotes the Box-PierceLjung Q statistic for residual autocorrelation to the 4th order, which is distributed as chi-squared (4) with critical value of 9.49 SBC is the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and J is a test of overidentifying restrictions. k is -1 for the backward-looking model and 8 (4) for inflation (output gap) when forward looking. The backward-looking rule is estimated by least squares; all other rules are estimated by GMM. 
